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The social and political impact of the new (private) National Security: private actors in the securitization of immigration in the U.S. post 9/11

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Abstract Neoliberal ideology has driven privatization across the globe steadily since the 1970s, advocating that the only way to meet macroeconomic objectives is to privatize public enterprise (Schmitt *Journal of Public Policy, 31*(1), 95, 1). As a result, market-like mechanisms are now embedded into what was traditionally public domain; this is the context under which immigration enforcement currently operates. Our previous research study showed the prison industrial complex is now also involved in immigration detention as a result of rigorous lobbying, policymaking, managing private contracts, and in the running of immigration detention centers themselves. We add to this line of research by suggesting that the ability of private actors to push for a more securitized state, due to their profit motive, results in a distortion of securitization that negatively impacts the groups it disproportionately targets, such as Latinos, immigrants, and Muslims in the U.S. Our research question is, *what is the social and political impact of securitization of immigration in the U.S. on racial, ethnic minorities and immigrants*? To do so, we turn to the existing lines of inquiry on prison privatization, its role in growing mass incarceration (due to profit motive), and its social and political effects on minorities in the U.S. because we believe these research areas overlap in a number of ways. Then, we run a series of quantitative analyses using hierarchical regression models to test nationally representative data from 2013 and compare our dependent variables measuring social and political elements across different social groups; our findings show that Latinos and immigrants in the U.S., which represent the groups most vulnerable to securitization, are worse off compared to whites and African Americans, even when controlling for education, income, and age in *both* social and political aspects.

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In June 2015, Donald Trump rode down an escalator at Trump Tower in New York City to announce his candidacy for president in a truly unconventional fashion, with an hour-long speech in which he called Mexican immigrants in the United States (U.S.) "criminals" and "rapists," first introduced his promise to build a "great, great wall on our southern border, and have Mexico pay for that wall." The speech proceeded with The Donald, in his usual narcissistic flair, stating, "Mark my words. Nobody would be tougher on ISIS than Donald Trump." People laughed in amusement. Jokes spread quickly throughout social media as he was certainly entertaining.

Trump's presidential campaign is based on a critical cornerstone piece, a crackdown on Mexican immigrants; footage of his political rallies throughout the country shows large crowds in attendance emphatically cheering for the U.S.-Mexico wall. Mexico is a regular talking point of the Trump campaign, as it is deemed responsible for a lagging economic recovery in the U.S. due to trade deals, jobs, wages, as well as a serious symbolic threat that endangers American values, culture, and identity through the large numbers of Mexican immigrants that reside in the U.S. Along with these talking points on the immigration threat, Trump also regularly discusses the terror threat, linking counterterrorism to immigration enforcement. In December of 2015, he released a press release calling for a "total and complete shutdown of Muslims entering the United States" after the San Bernadino attacks.

Though initially not taken seriously, Trump won more state contests than any other of the other 17 Republican candidates initially in the presidency race. He easily secured the 1237 delegates needed for the Republican nomination and officially won the nomination during the National Republican Convention July 2016.

Securitization of immigration: adding private corporations

We use this anecdote as an illustration to showcase how the securitization of immigration governance has become prevalent and largely accepted throughout the U.S., and how it provides political gains for those who most loudly endorse these ideas. The securitization of immigration governance is "a process through which Western political elites—governments, leading political parties, and associated policy networks—rhetorically frame immigration as a security threat" ([2], p. 3). Since the horrific attacks of September 11th, it is observable how governments on both sides of the Atlantic have produced an escalating number of public policies that justify the expansion of state powers at the expense of democracy and individual civil liberties. In the U.S., the War on Terror continues to grow based on the magnitude of its inputs and activities and based on the amount of government financial, personnel, and technological resources devoted to protecting national security [3].

However, we propose this picture whose key players are governments, political parties, and associated policy networks is incomplete because it fails to include corporate money interests; private entities are an integral part of the power elites

responsible for encouraging an increasingly securitized state. We also argue that this story is one the U.S. knows all too well as it is history repeating itself. The War on Terror is strikingly similar to the U.S.'s previous War on Drugs, which led to a boom in mass incarceration disproportionately devastating African Americans and their families. Most notably, however, is the fact that the War on Drugs and the tough on crime movement were facilitated by the powerful private prison industrial complex. Meaning, the industry that scored the lucrative and coveted government contracts to incarcerate felons *created* those felons through lobbying and as a result of the harsh criminal justice laws and mandatory minimum sentencing laws they themselves sponsored. Through millions of lobbying dollars to both political parties, the private prison industrial complex was able to write the laws that resulted in an influx of prisoners, amassing them unprecedented levels of profits [4].

Similarly, as the securitization of immigration governance has grown in size and scope in the U.S., governments at all levels have turned to private contracts to keep up with this exponentially increasing demand [5]. According to Bortolotti et al. [6], "liberal economic policies in general and privatization in particular have spread around the globe in recent decades" (p. 95). Neoliberal ideology has driven privatization across the globe steadily since the 1970s, advocating that the only way to meet macroeconomic objectives is to privatize public enterprise [1]. As a result, market-like mechanisms are now embedded into what was traditionally public domain; this is the current context of immigration enforcement. Our previous research study showed the prison industrial complex is now also involved in immigration detention as a result of rigorous lobbying, policymaking, managing private contracts, and in the running of immigration detention centers themselves (Moreno [7]). This initial exploratory study illustrated how the prison industrial complex industry has turned to immigration detention as a new untapped market for more profits, with private prisons spending most (over 90 %) of their lobbying dollars in states that have proposed harsher and more stringent immigration laws, like Arizona's infamous Senate Bill (S.B.) 1070. Ultimately, this creates financial returns and higher profits for them (Moreno [7, 8]).

We add to this line of research by suggesting that the ability of private actors to push for a more securitized state, because of their profit motive, results in a distortion of securitization [9], one that negatively impacts the groups that it disproportionately targets in the U.S., such as Latinos, immigrants, Muslims, and anyone socially perceived as a "foreigner." Our research question is, *what is the social and political impact of securitization of immigration in the U.S. on racial, ethnic minorities and immigrants*? To do so, we turn to the existing lines of inquiry on prison privatization, its role in growing mass incarceration (due to profit motive), and its social and political effects on minorities in the U.S. because we believe these research areas overlap in a number of ways. First, we review the social, political, and economic effects of mass incarceration on racial and ethnic minorities in the U.S., which were the direct result of private interests shaping key legislation, as is the current case of immigration and security. Then, we run a series of quantitative analyses using hierarchical regression models to test nationally representative data from 2013 and compare our dependent variables measuring social and political elements across different social groups. Our findings show that Latinos and immigrants in the U.S., which represent the groups most vulnerable to securitization, are worse off compared to whites and African Americans, even when controlling for education, income, and age in *both* social and political aspects.

Background

Our initial analysis (Moreno [7]) showed evidence that the private prison industrial complex has adapted and updated their business strategy from the War on Drugs to the current War on Terror, with very similar causal mechanisms in place to shape legislation and increase profit; please see Figs. 1 and 2 for visual illustrations of these similarities. Because the political actors are the same and their actions are exceptionally similar, we predict this new and unique line of research will tell a similar story to that of how the private prison industrial complex, driven by profit motive, grew mass incarceration and resulted in the adverse impact detrimental to African Americans in the U.S., with weakened social, political, and economic structures that perpetually hinder democracy and promote social inequality. Thanks to the extensive literature that has carefully documented the detrimental effects of the War on Drugs on Black and Brown families throughout America [4, 11, 12], we focus on juggling the anomalies of the securitization of immigration to push together lines of research that will provide a more comprehensive and complete picture of how the securitization of immigration

Fig. 1 Original model. Note: This model was used by Price [4] from Biewen [10]



Fig. 2 Updated model by Moreno Saldivar and Price [7]

governance has impacted immigrant and minority groups in the U.S. This is presented in the context that private corporate interests are inherently linked to these effects and are, to some extent, responsible for the social and political impact on groups most vulnerable to securitization.

This area of inquiry, which combines interdisciplinary research produced by scholars on the impact of the securitization of immigration governance, as well as the political economics associated with markets, and the prison industrial complex's role in facilitating government legislation that will generate the highest levels of profit possible at the expense of democracy remains understudied and is of grave importance, especially in the given political climate, with more and more Americans worrying about the social cohesion of American culture and potential terrorist attacks. The *New York Times* referred to the 2016 presidential election as a national security one, as issues of immigration and security have taken center stage as the most important concerns to voters of both political parties.

Previous research relevant to our specific research question has largely focused on four key areas: the evolution of immigration policies and politics post 9/11 as exclusionary and xenophobic [13–15]; the securitization process, consisting of discourse and speech acts [16]; integration and social incorporation of immigrants in host societies, arguing security-driven policies have become barriers to these processes post 9/11 and lead to alienation [17]; and, finally, how ethno-racial groups manage intergroup competition, social and symbolic boundaries, and shape their political responses according to institutions and national ideologies ([2], p. 5).

Although these lines of research make for a greater understanding of immigrant processes and potential responses to an evolving securitized sector of immigration, they fail to include the political economy perspective. These lines of research do not mention that immigrant processes are affected by private corporations, questioning the

normative reach and scope of what in theory has traditionally been public sector domain. The detention of immigrants is a new market for the private prison industry, generating profits by capitalizing on the political discourse that actively reinforces immigrants as a security threat and shaping subsequent public policies that disproportionately target and burden immigrants, Latinos, and Muslims in the U.S. Finally, these existing lines of research fail to address that although 9/11 marks the beginning of a new security paradigm, the War on Terror can learn from revisiting the social and political outcomes that resulted from the War on Drugs on racial and ethnic minorities in attempts to learn from and correct perverse causal mechanisms that damage democracy. These items are all addressed here. We contend that in order to enforce accountability of the state, we should also weigh the effects of its outsourcing to private contractors and what this means for democracy, social equity, due process, fairness, and civil liberties. We link the social and political outcomes of securitization to private prisons, as governments increasingly defer to these in the immigration enforcement sector.

This paper consists of two parts: part one summarizes the social, political, and economic effects the War on Drugs had on Black and Brown communities in the U.S.; the War on Drugs was a state initiative that gravely represented private moneyed interests, especially the private prison industrial complex, and generated vast profits for these corporations through the mass incarceration boom created by the implementation of harsh legislation the corporations themselves wrote, sponsored, and lobbied for. Part two presents an empirical analysis that provides us with a profile of racial and ethnic minorities' and immigrants' current social and political standing. Though a limitation of the empirical analysis is that we cannot fully isolate the effects of securitization given the complexity of the data available, we examine the social and political variables of minorities and immigrants using nationally representative data from 2013, a year by which securitization is in full force in America, and we find that those disproportionately targeted by securitization and the War on Terror, specifically immigrants and Latinos, have lower levels of both social and political capital. We conclude by predicting that the War on Terror will have marginalizing, disenfranchisement effects just as the War on Drugs had on African Americans in America; however, the main divergence in our findings and our predictions is in *the response* of those targeted. While African Americans were able to politically mobilize and protest against veiled attempts to undermine their civil rights (currently, this is visible through the #BlackLivesMatter movement), our findings show a much bleaker picture when it comes to Latinos and immigrants.

This story isn't new: the role of markets and private interests in the war on drugs

It is imperative to consider, due to the existing parallels, the effects the War on Drugs had on those it targeted, which were disproportionately Black and Brown men. Because of the profit motive of private prisons, the prison industrial complex played a key role in the proliferation of tougher sentencing laws and increasing incarceration rates [18]. Private prisons were key to growing mass incarceration in the U.S. through a number of initiatives, and so it becomes increasingly difficult to distinguish or isolate the War on

Drugs by public or private sector because privatization allowed private prisons to intertwine with government contracts and public agencies on a very large scale [4]. A similar pattern has been observed regarding the securitization of immigration; private contractors (a lot of them the same actors as in the War on Drugs, for example) are proliferated through the political economy of security and immigration, with more and more private enterprises involved, shaping, and profiting from the technology, transportation, and detainment practices that are now becoming standard practices in the securitization of immigration. In this section, we summarize the effects of prison privatization and mass incarceration on racial and ethnic minorities, by economic, political, and social impact.

According to Price and Morris, "the past four decades have witnessed a worldwide movement toward the privatization of goods and services traditionally, provided, produced, and delivered by government" ([19], p. 1). The contemporary roots of private prisons can be traced to the "tough on crime" movement, which served as the impetus for the incarceration boom. This epoch had its beginning in the late 1960s and early 1970s. The late 1970s and early 1980s ushered in the War on Drugs campaign with the Rockefeller Drug Laws being the most infamous of all the policy changes related to drug policy. Smith and Hattery [20] explain that other key changes to drug laws, such as mandatory minimums [21], longer sentences for crack cocaine possession [22], felony drug offenses [22], and three-strike laws [23] all contributed to the U.S. incarcerating more than 2.3 million citizens, approximately 1.3 million in state and federal prisons and another million in other prisons, according to the Bureau of Justice Statistics. Concomitant with the increasing incarceration rate, "practically overnight the budgets of federal law enforcement agencies soared. Between 1980 and 1984, FBI antidrug funding increased from $8 million to $95 million. Department of Defense antidrug allocations increased from $33 million in 1981 to $1,042 million in 1991. During that same period, DEA antidrug spending grew from $86 million to $1,026 million, and FBI antidrug allocations grew from $38 to 181 million" (Alexander 2010, p. 49). Ironically, during the same period, public agencies in the preventative and rehabilitative areas of government that focused on drug treatment, prevention and education had their operational budgets severely slashed. For instance, the National Institute of Drug Abuse's budget was cut from $274 million to $57 million from 1981 to 1984 (Alexander 2012), and antidrug funds awarded to the Department of Education were cut from $14 million to $3 million (U.S. Office of the National Drug Policy, National Drug Strategy, 1992).

The campaigns associated with the tough on crime and the War on Drugs movements, along with President Reagan's push to permanently reduce the role and scope of government, created a ripe economic environment for private prisons to thrive. Private prison corporations were quick to seize the opportunity and exploit this environment, which began to deemphasize restorative justice and concentrate on punishment as a very lucrative for-profit industry.

This led to a number of societal deficiencies. For example, "the for-profit prisons have transformed into a vast industrial system at the expense of education in many states. The police, lawyers, court staff, lobbyists, convicts, long-distance phone service providers, and prison personnel all are a part of this growing business behemoth that generates billions of dollars for the for-profit prisons" ([4], p. 111). Blessett adds, Nixon's declaration against crime gave credibility to the public's unwarranted perceptions of crime and violence, particularly their perceptions of African Americans as

dangerous and deviants" ([24], p. 13). Blessett explains that the Republican strategy was successful thanks to the use of coded anti-black campaign rhetoric ([24], citing Beckett & Sasson [25]), which appealed to deep-rooted institutional racial bias in the U.S. Similar parallels exist in which Latino immigrants in the U.S. are socially constructed as "deviant" and are presented as a symbolic threat to the U.S.'s national identity and social cohesion ([26], referencing [27]).

Furthermore, a review of a report on prisoners in 2010 [28] shows that 30 states maintain a degree of privatization and seven states house more than a quarter of their prison population in for-profit prison facilities.

> In 2010, private prisons held 128,195 of the 1.6 million state and federal prisoners in the United States, representing eight percent of the total population. For the period 1999-2010, the number of individuals held in private prisons grew by 80 percent, compared to 18 percent for the overall prison population. While both federal and state governments increasingly relied on privatization, the federal prison system's commitment to privatization grew much more dramatically. The number of federal prisoners held in private prisons rose from 3,828 to 33,830, an increase of 784 percent, while the number of state prisoners incarcerated privately grew by 40 percent, from 67,380 to 94,365. (Mason, 2012, p. 1)

Table 1 illustrates the point with respect to how private prisons have expanded their market.

To further help their cause and take advantage of this prison boom, private prison companies provided substantial financial support to the American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC). This organization is reputable for championing privatization initiatives and advocating for harsher sentencing and detention laws, such as mandatory sentencing statues and drafting model legislation on privatization [29].

According to the Justice Policy Institute (2011), "At a time when many policymakers are looking at criminal and juvenile justice reforms that would safely shrink the size of our prison population, the existence of private prison companies creates a countervailing interest in preserving the current approach to criminal justice and increasing the use of incarceration" (p. 2). The system remains preserved, and an entire commercial correctional complex developed concomitant with the expansion of detention driven by profit motive. Pager [30] found that "in terms of policy implications, this research has troubling conclusions. In our frenzy of locking people up, our 'crime control' policies may in fact exacerbate the very conditions that lead to crime in the first place" (p. 961).

The economic result from the private prison industry's mass incarceration boom

Mass incarceration, as a direct result of the private prison industry's powerful lobby, eroded economic prospects of Black and Brown men by charging offenders with fees and a criminal record. These fees are then used to support the expansion and growth of private prisons.

Pager [30] emphasized the point that the "research consistently shows that finding quality steady employment is one of the strongest predictors of desistance from crime" [31–33]. Ultimately, "the fact is that a criminal record severely limits employment opportunities—particularly among blacks" ([30], p. 961; [34])."

Social networks are also compromised by incarceration and further exacerbate the inability to find legal employment; even worse, it forces ex-offenders to develop new social networks, which may make criminal activity more likely.

American legislatures "deny convicted offenders the right to enter into contracts, automatically dissolving their marriages, and barring them from a wide variety of jobs and benefits" ([35], p. 18). Additional adverse impacts of felony disenfranchisement laws are the "denial of public housing, welfare benefits, the mobility necessary to access jobs that require driving, child support, parental rights, the ability to obtain an education, and in, the case of deportation, access to opportunities that brought immigrants to this country" ([35], p. 18). The combination of cost shifting and the inability to find stable employment leaves the formerly incarcerated unable to meet the obligations of supporting their families and stabilizing their home life.

Another impediment to reform that can challenge the growth of private prisons is the fact that these facilities now provide local employment and represent economic development to a number of states and to a substantial number of counties and municipalities throughout the U.S.

The social result from the private prison industry's mass incarceration boom

Loury [36] built on Alexander's research by connecting detention, democracy, and inequality with marginalization and disconnectedness. Research documents that incarceration has an adverse impact on those it incarcerates as well as on adult children of incarcerated parents [37]. They find that "the adult children of incarcerated parents are less civically engaged than other children of similar backgrounds" ([37], p. 46). This study attributes this behavior to the parents who were not civically engaged themselves; "prisoner's offspring, in turn, end up being less likely to be registered to vote, less likely to have voted in the last president election, and less likely to engage in community service" ([37], p. 46). The authors also find that the children of incarcerated parents report less trust in government and perceive more discrimination.

Muller and Schrage [38] also found a correlation between weakened family structures, the ability to find stable employment, achievement of economic security, and incarceration. They believe American's high rates of imprisonment has the ability to erode Americans' trust in government. Byproducts of this growing distrust are social movements to reduce the number of people in prison and a "self-reproducing cycle whereby growing distrust leads to more punishment and more punishment leads to more distrust" ([38], p. 141).

Because of the U.S.'s hyper-incarceration, "a person can cease to have economic value in capitalism if they cannot be deployed productively" ([39], p. 131). As this devaluing takes place, there is a disengagement from society and an erosion of social bonds precisely in the communities with the direst need of stability. Given the social costs associated with incarceration, at what point do policy makers reform the current system? "Prison expansion is expensive in the costs it imposes on both those who serve time behind bars and in absorbing tax dollars. Policy discussion should be informed by the limitation of the fact that prison expansion, beyond a certain point, will no longer serve any reasonable purpose. It seems that that point has been reached" ([40], p. 247). Although prisons have reached their marginal diminishing returns, the incentive to reform them is thwarted because of the lobbying dollars they provide to both political

parties, which are critical to finance political campaigns, and ensuring that any changes that would cut into private prisons' profit dollars are not politically feasible.

The political result from the private prison industry's mass incarceration boom

A result of the mass incarceration in America, which incarcerates more people than any other nation in the world, is the disproportionate and unequal marginalizing of African Americans and Latinos. "Like Jim Crow, mass incarceration marginalizes them physically (in prisons, jails, and ghettos), and then authorizes discrimination against them in voting, employment, housing, education, public benefits, and jury service" (Alexander 2010, p. 11).

Loury finds that "a fundamental source of contemporary inequality in punishment is the alienation of local urban populations from the exercise of democratic controls over the apparatus of punishment" ([36], p. 179). To this point, Harrison and Beck (2003) "sees direct citizen participation in bringing charges against fellow citizens and deciding their disposition as having a crucial role in establishing, and in shaping the character of, Athenian democratic practice" ([36], p. 179). As a result of being marginalized, African Americans and Latinos are less likely to participate in direct democracy and play less of a role in shaping American democratic practice. Owens [41] describes this marginalization as ways to sideline them from the public square. To further alienate African American and Latino ex-offenders, Owens contends, "parolees and probationers are often perceived as undeserving of citizen benefits such as food stamps, subsidized college loans, public housing and professional opportunities like licenses and contracts and deprive them of the right to vote and exercise full and free citizenship" ([41], p. 257).

Pioneering work by Weaver and Lerman [42] and Lerman and Weaver [43] hypothesized that contact with the criminal justice system leads to decreased political participation because it depletes resources and increases distrust in government, which ultimately translates into reduced commitments to civic norms. Burch stated, "The criminal justice system has the power to shape not only the political participation of current and former felons but also the participation of the people who live around them because criminal justice interactions are demographically and geographically concentrated" ([44], p. 185). "There are two primary mechanisms by which spending time in prison might reduce political participation: through the effect of laws curtailing voting rights and through the effect of spending time in prison on attitudes and human and social capital" ([45], p. 2).

> Nationally, an estimated 5.85 million Americans are denied the right to vote because of laws that prohibit voting by people with felony convictions. Felony disenfranchisement is an obstacle to participation in democratic life which is exacerbated by racial disparities in the criminal justice system, resulting in 1 of every 13 African Americans unable to vote. (The [46])

Gerber et al. [45] found that political participation of those formerly incarcerated is low once they become eligible to vote; of the potential explanations considered, they find that contact with the criminal justice system and incarceration as the finding with the most explanatory power. The authors contend, "there are a variety of mechanisms

by which time in prison may reduce political involvement" ([45], p. 8). In the end, they "learn that they have less standing in the social and political community through this contact with the carceral state" (p. 9).

Political representation for African Americans and Latinos is also diminished as a result of imprisonment because felony disenfranchisement laws dilute the already limited political power in these communities [47]. Gottschalk [48] explained how impactful felony disenfranchisement laws are on African American and Latino representation; in the 2000 and 2004 presidential elections, an estimated five million Americans were unable to vote because of a felony conviction. Moreover, Manza and Uggen ([49], p. 10) calculated that "if Florida had not banned so many ex-felons from voting in the 2000 election, Al Gore would have carried the state by at least thirty thousand votes handily winning the White House."

An even more egregious effect of felony disenfranchisement laws on African American and Latino representation is prison-based gerrymandering. Prisoners are counted for census purposes where they are incarcerated, and because of this peculiarity in the census, "prisoners are included in the population tallies used for congressional reapportionment and for redistricting state legislatures, county governments, and city councils" ([48], p. 444). Recently, "In May 2006, a federal appeals court suggested that counting tens of thousands of African American and Latino prisoners from New York City as upstate residents may be illegally diluting the voting rights of people downstate under section 2 of the Voting Rights Act" ([48], p. 445).

Finally, researchers have consistently found that the devaluing experience of incarceration impacts and shapes the political behaviors and attitudes of those formerly incarcerated as well as their families [50–52]. "Ex-prisoners are less trusting of government, less likely to think they can influence politics, less engaged in political conversation, and far less likely to participate politically than those with no prior involvement in the criminal justice system" ([49], p. 111).

In summation, based on the private prisons' business model and previous empirical work that demonstrates an adverse impact on African Americans and Latinos, we predict the new security governance in enforcing immigration, which continues to become increasingly privatized and follows a very similar business model, will result in similar negative social, political, and economic effects for racial and ethnic minorities and immigrants. We contend that securitization in its current form, tightly linked to private corporations vested in the continual growth of this industry, will affect how racial and ethnic minorities and immigrants are politically inactive and withdrawn, which will then hinder the developing and/or strengthening of social capital of these groups, and will also affect their political affiliation, ideology, and mobilization pattern(s).

Securitization of immigration, possible by "threat" construction

Bigo [53] attributed the securitization of immigration to several factors; first, the fear by those who hold political power of losing "their" symbolic territories to foreigners and immigrants; second, securitization is facilitated by globalization of technologies of

surveillance and control that exist beyond countries' borders; third, securitization of immigration exists because structural risk is embedded in neoliberal discourse as a limit to freedom (p. 65). Bigo refers to the securitization of immigration as a "transversal political technology" (p. 65) because "the framing of the state as a body endanger[ed] by migrants is a political narrative activated for the purpose of political games in ways that permit each politician to distance himself or herself from other politicians, but within the same rules of the game. It is a social construction useful for the politicization of migration" (p. 68). Indeed, security and immigration are large political opportunities for those in power, as illustrated by our opening Trump anecdote. Bigo stated, "The relation between security and migration is fully and immediately political. The wording is never innocent" ([53], p. 71). This is problematic once democracy becomes compromised and justifiably so in light of emergency and exception.

In the U.S., security is framed a severe threat, a multidimensional one that not endangers national identity and social cohesion (perhaps best illustrated by Huntington [27]), but the complexity of this security threat became increasingly nuanced once terrorism was added to the already existing rhetoric of how immigrants bring an influx of crime, a depletion of public resources, and endanger local economies. After 9/11, immigration policy became counter-terrorist policy in the U.S., and vice versa [3]. Chebel d'Appollonia [3] presents how the terms "immigrant" with "terrorist" were consistently linked in the aftermath of 9/11, which led to a new heightened security mantra and resulted in two effects:

> First, terrorism was portrayed as a threat not only to people's lives but also to their values, freedom, and economic and social welfare, justifying exceptional responses, outside the realm of normal democratic politics. Second, the category constituting the 'others'—those outside the mainstream of society who were considered to pose a security threat—was also broadened. Today it includes all those who threaten—or are perceived to threaten—national unity and civil security. The categories of foreigners, immigrants, and suspicious minorities have been increasingly conflated—irrespective of their actual status—because 'the impossibility of knowing where and against whom to fight back had led to increasing unease about the identity and the location of the enemy. (p.3)

This has facilitated a number of things; first, the domestic audience in the U.S. at large has shown little to no political resistance (in fact, it is often quite the opposite) when political leaders frame immigration and security as threats that must be aggressively tackled by the state. Ultimately, the implementation of the policy solutions set forth by the state actively targets and burdens immigrants, Latinos, and Muslims, yet are framed by the state as the only feasible solution(s). Secondly, it has caused the groups most vulnerable to securitization to "express strong concerns about being singled out for increased surveillance, monitoring, racial profiling, and increased discrimination" ([2], p. 3). However, because of the lack of social and political clout within the Latino and Muslim communities in the U.S., challenges to securitization are left unsaid out of fear and resentment [26, 54]. The culmination of these factors result in a political landscape in which the social construction of knowledge relies on the manipulation of images and its accompanying sensational political rhetoric; these are used to justify policy

responses that are punitive and burdensome and provide gains for political leaders as well as private contractors.

Transitioning to the war on terror, the same private interests

The same ALEC organization that spread tough on crime legislation is now involved in restrictive anti-immigrant laws, such as Arizona's S.B. 1070. ALEC designed and drafted this legislation, then sponsored and advocated for it across the U.S., leading to 36 state legislatures considering Arizona copycat bills (Moreno [7, 55]). Most of the federal privatization in Table 1 can be ascribed to "an unprecedented increase in the number of detained immigrants— incarcerated pursuant to civil detention authority but housed in prison-like conditions" ([29], p. 16). A *Huffington Post* investigation reinforces the data in Table 1 as it found that there is a concerted effort by the private prison industry to tilt polices favorable to increased immigration detention [56]. Moreover, the investigation found:

> In Washington, the industry's lobbyists have influenced policy to secure growing numbers of federal inmates in its facilities, while encouraging Congress to increase funding for detention bedspace. Here is this southern Arizona community, private prison companies share the spoils of their business with the local government, effectively giving area law enforcement an incentive to apprehend as many undocumented immigrants as they can. [56]

The *Huffington Post* investigation confirms that lobbying has contributed to a doubling of immigrant detainees. The report found that immigration detainees has increased to about 400,000 a year and half are held in private prisons, up from one-fourth a decade ago according to the report which cites the Department of Homeland Security [56]. As a result of the successfully lobbying, the two largest for profit prison corporations, Corrections Corporation of America (CCA) and The GEO Group have more than doubled their immigration detention revenues since 2005, according to the report.

The ACLU [29] reported the for-profit prison companies house nearly 50 % of the more than 30,000 immigrants detained by Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) at any given time. Recently, it was discovered that ALEC itself drafted Arizona's S.B. 1070 [57, 58]. Furthermore, Moreno Saldivar and Price [7] demonstrated that the private prison lobby funds exist overwhelmingly in states that have proposed anti-immigrant bills very similar to Arizona's, with CCA and The GEO Group spending over 90 % of their lobbying dollars between 2003 and 2012 in states that proposed Arizona copycat bills ([7], p. 40). Goodkind [59] of Yahoo Finance reports that "Private prisons bring in about $3 billion in revenue annually, and over half of that comes from holding facilities for undocumented immigrants. Private operations run between 50% to 55% of immigrant detainment facilities" [59]. "Seemingly ever increasing number of immigrants in the United States – and elsewhere – are incarcerated while awaiting immigration and deportation hearings, in facilities including county- and state-operated prisons and privately managed detention centers" ([60], p. 335). This carceral

expansion is driven by privatization, the rise of interior immigration policing, and the securitization of immigration [60].

Data and method

Given that it has been established that private prisons are inherently involved in the passing of anti-immigrant legislation that has grown immigration detention (which they run), this study attempts to provide a portrait of how this affects those most affected by the securitized immigration sector. To empirically test the current social and political standing of those most vulnerable to being affected by the securitization of immigration in the U.S. (immigrants and Latinos), this study uses secondary quantitative data from the Current Population Survey (CPS) from 2013. The CPS is a nationally representative dataset executed by the U.S. Census Bureau, with the individual respondent as the unit of analysis. The CPS uses a random sample, allowing for generalizations on the U.S. population to be made. The data used in this statistical analysis includes a sub-sample of 25,321 observations. This study relies on hierarchical regression to illustrate the quantitative models' explanatory power as more independent variables are added to the analysis. The year of the data, 2013, is important because it means that the securitization context is well established in the U.S.; the U.S. had an influx of anti-immigrant legislative initiatives that began after 9/11. Notably, there was a wave of state anti-immigrant bills after Arizona passed its Senate Bill 1070 in 2010, which was sponsored and drafted by members of the private prison lobby (Moreno [7]); this caused 36 states to propose copycat legislation in their state legislatures. This is our rationale in using the 2013 dataset.

The key dependent variables included in this study are two—the social impact and the political impact of securitization on those it is most likely to affect most. To examine the social impact of securitization, we operationalize this variable by using a survey question that inquires on the respondent's level of trust in their community and neighborhood; respondents are asked to answer the question using a Likert scale from low to high. This variable is relevant because it is indicative of a respondents' social capital and sense of belonging in their community. Scholars of securitization have argued that the discrimination incurred by immigrants and minorities as a result of securitized immigration processes has resulted in alienation at both the individual and group levels; however, scholars have failed to provide empirical evidence of this. Given the complexity of studying these phenomena, this is to be expected. However, despite these limitations, we use this measure of the level of trust in the community as a proxy to compare responses between racial and ethnic groups as well as immigrants to address whether alienation is inferred, or whether Latinos and immigrants actually express similar levels of trust as their white and Black counterparts. This social aspect can also be linked to levels of social capital, which research identifies as a determinant of civic engagement [61].

Additionally, to examine the political impact of securitization, we operationalize this by using two measures from the survey on political attitudes and participation, one that inquires on how often the respondent votes (using a Likert scale, low to high) and another that asks how often the respondent discusses politics with family and friends (also, using a Likert scale, low to high). The body of work on political participation is

largely quantitative and focuses on conventional, or electoral, participation. This is a limiting factor when studying Latinos, who naturalize in lower numbers and at a slower pace than other immigrant groups, and immigrants in general. Therefore, our analysis includes a measure of political participation that is conventional, how often a respondent participates in electoral elections, as well as an unconventional measure, which asks how often a respondent discusses politics with family and/or friends (citizenship is not required). We use the two to get a sense of political attitudes and participation among the different groups.

The independent variables included in this study are race, ethnicity, immigrant and citizenship status; socio-demographic variables of education level, household yearly income, and age are included as control variables.

A three-step hierarchical multiple regression is used. Hierarchical regression uses ordinary least squares (OLS) regression in a nested format to compare explanatory power between models. This method is also appropriate because it accommodates multiple predictor variables.

The first quantitative model begins with educational attainment level, household annual income, and age as socio-demographic variables that we control for.

$$\Upsilon = \beta_0 + \beta_1 X_1 + \beta_2 X_2 + \beta_3 X_3$$

The second quantitative model adds race and ethnicity, allowing for comparisons to be made across white, African American, and Latino respondents.

The third and final model adds whether the respondent is a foreign-born immigrant or native-born, as well as whether the respondent is a citizen or not, distinguishing between foreign-born respondents who have become naturalized citizens and those who are legal residents.

Unstandardized coefficients as well as standardized are reported; standard errors as well. However, since the key variables used in this data analyses exist in a variety of raw units of measurement, the beta coefficients are the most useful and indicate the strength in the weight of each variable.

Findings

This study uses hierarchical analysis to examine the social and political effects of securitization, beginning with the social impact. This first portion of the analysis used the level of trust the respondent has in his/her community and neighborhood as the main dependent variable (Table 2). This analysis resulted in a number of things: first, each hierarchical model gradually increases the R^2, or the explanatory power, of each model, and each of the models are highly statistically significant, which is a positive indication of the quantitative analyses included in this study.

The first step of the model begins with control variables, which include educational attainment level, household income, and age; these socio-demographic variables that measure resources are all, unsurprisingly, highly significant. The R^2 of the first model begins with 09 %, meaning 09 % of the variation in explaining the predictors of level of trust in community is explained by the control variables included. This R^2 increased gradually as the hierarchical models included more independent variables. In the

Table 1 Change in private prison populations, 1999–2010

Jurisdiction	Number in private Prisons		Percent Change	Percentage of population		Percent Change
	1999	2010		1999	2010	
Alabama	0	1024		0	3.2 %	
Alaska	1387	1873	35 %	35.1 %	33.5 %	-5 %
Arizona	1392	5356	285 %	5.4 %	13.3 %	146 %
Arkansas	1224	0	-100 %	10.7 %	0	-100 %
California	4621	2170	-53 %	2.8 %	1.3 %	-54 %
Colorado		4498		*	19.7 %	
Connecticut	0	883		0	4.6 %	
Delaware	0	0		0	0	
Florida	3773	11,796	213 %	5.4 %	11.3 %	109 %
Georgia	3001	5233	74 %	7.1 %	10.6 %	49 %
Hawaii	1168	1931	65 %	23.8 %	32.7 %	37 %
Idaho	400	2236	459 %	8.3 %	30.1 %	263 %
Illinois	0	0		0	0	
Indiana	936	2817	201 %	4.8 %	10.1 %	110 %
Iowa	0	0		0	0	
Kansas	0	0		0	0	
Kentucky	1700	2127	25 %	11.1 %	10.4 %	-6 %
Louisiana	3080	2921	-5 %	9 %	7.4 %	-18 %
Maine	22	0	-100 %	1.3 %	0	-100 %
Maryland	131	70	-47 %	0.6 %	0.3 %	-50 %
Massachusetts	0	0		0	0	
Michigan	301	0	-100 %	0.6 %	0	-100 %
Minnesota	80	0	-100 %	1.3 %	0	-100 %
Mississippi	3429	5241	53 %	18.8 %	24.9 %	32 %
Missouri	0	0		0	0	
Montana	726	1502	107 %	24.6 %	40.4 %	64 %
Nebraska	0	0		0	0	
Nevada	561	0	-100 %	5.9 %	0	-100 %
New Hampshire	0	0		0	0	
New Jersey	2517	2841	13 %	8 %	11.45	43 %
New Mexico	1873	2905	55 %	38.6 %	43.6 %	13 %
New York	0	0		0	0	
North Carolina	1395	208	-85 %	4.5 %	0.5 %	-89 %
North Dakota	0	0		0	0	
Ohio	0	3038		0	5.9 %	
Oklahoma	6228	6019	-3 %	27.8 %	22.9 %	-18 %
Oregon	0	0		0	0	
Pennsylvania	0	1015		0	2 %	
Rhode Island	0	0		0	0	
South Carolina	0	17		0	0.1 %	

Table 1 (continued)

Jurisdiction	Number in private Prisons		Percent Change	Percentage of population		Percent Change
	1999	2010		1999	2010	
South Dakota	46	5	-89 %	1.8 %	0.1 %	-94 %
Tennessee	3476	5120	47 %	15.4 %	18.7	21 %
Texas	11,653	19,155	64 %	7.1 %	11 %	55 %
Utah	248	0	-100 %	4.6 %	0	-100 %
Vermont	0	562		0	27 %	
Virginia	1542	1560	1 %	4.8 %	4.2 %	-12 %
Washington	331	0	-100 %	2.3 %	0	-100 %
West Virginia	0	0		0	0	
Wisconsin	3421	25	-99 %	16.8 %	0.1 %	-99 %
Wyoming	281	217	-23 %	16.4 %	10.35	-37 %
Federal	3828	33,830	784 %	2.8 %	16.1 %	475 %
State	67,380	94,365	40 %	5.5 %	6.8 %	24 %
Total	71,208	128,195	80 %	5.2 %	8 %	54 %

second model, which added race and ethnicity, the R^2 increases to 13 %, and finally, in the third and last step of the hierarchical model, it is 14 %. This means 14 % of the variation in predicting a respondent's level of trust in their community is accounted by the full (third) model, which includes control variables controlling for individual's resources of education, and income, socio-demographic variables of age, race, and ethnicity, and the last step includes variables of whether the respondent is an immigrant and a citizen (naturalized or native). All models are highly significant, indicating a good fit, and the standardized beta coefficients allow us to determine the weight and strength of each variable in comparable order to the other variables included, even though all are

Table 2 Social impact: summary of hierarchical regression analysis for variables predicting respondent's trust in their community and neighborhood (n = 25,321)

	Model 1			Model 2			Model 3		
Variable	B	SE B	B	B	SE B	B	B	SE B	β
Education	0.08	0.01	0.09***	0.06	0.01	.07***	0.06	0.01	.07***
Household Income	0.04	0.00	0.18***	0.03	0.00	.14***	0.03	0.00	.14***
Age	0.01	0.00	0.22***	0.01	0.00	.18***	0.01	0.00	.18***
White				0.19	0.02	.09***	0.15	0.02	.06***
African American				-.29	0.02	-.10***	-.33	0.03	-.12***
Latino				-.35	0.02	-.12***	-.30	0.02	-.11***
Immigrant							-.13	0.02	-.05***
Citizenship							-.05	0.03	.01***
R^2	0.09			0.13			0.14		

*p < .05, ** p < .01, ***p < .001

measured in different raw, original units. The positive or negative sign indicates the sign of the relationship. This means that the largest positive predictors of level of trust are income and age, meaning the higher the level of income and the older the respondent, then the higher level of trust reported.

The next two strongest predictors are negative, which include African American and Latino respondents. This means that race and ethnicity are negatively correlated with level of trust in their community and neighborhood. White respondents are the only group with a positive relationship, indicating higher levels of trust among this population. Immigrants also show a negative relationship, meaning that if a respondent is an immigrant, the level of trust in their community is lower than those respondents who are not immigrants.

This is important to consider when we think about levels of social capital, of which African Americans, Latinos, and immigrants have the lowest, and when we consider this is exactly what makes the social construction of security *against* these groups by large and powerful corporations (and the politicians whose campaigns they finance) very doable and practical, and will allow these to continue to frame immigration as a severe security threat.

This also has implications in the response to securitization by African Americans, Latinos, and immigrants—low levels of social capital indicate a lower likelihood of responding in protest by any of these groups, meaning an acquiescence response to securitization by those it targets most.

The next portion of the analysis (Table 3) distinguishes between conventional and unconventional forms of political participation as a response to securitization.

The first analysis examining conventional political participation (voting) resulted in all three steps of the hierarchical regression being highly statistically significant. The first model, which are the control variables, resulted in an R^2 of 19 %, meaning 19 % of the variation in explaining how often a respondent votes is explained by education, income, and age. These variables are all highly significant, which was expected based on the vast amount of literature and

Table 3 Impact on political participation (conventional, electoral): summary of hierarchical regression analysis for variables predicting how often a respondent votes (n = 25,321)

	Model 1			Model 2			Model 3		
Variable	B	SE B	B	B	SE B	B	B	SE B	β
Education	0.27	0.01	0.22***	0.25	0.01	.21***	0.24	0.01	.20***
Household Income	0.04	0.00	0.12***	0.04	0.00	.13***	0.04	0.00	.12***
Age	0.02	0.00	0.34***	0.02	0.02	.32***	0.02	0.00	.31***
White				0.44	0.03	.14***	0.18	0.03	.06***
African American				0.71	0.03	.18***	0.46	0.03	.12***
Latino				-0.42	0.02	-0.11***	-.06	0.02	-.01*
Immigrant							-.29	0.03	-.08***
Citizenship							0.89	0.04	.17***
R^2	0.19			0.22			0.26		

*p < .05, ** p < .01, ***p < .001

Table 4 Impact on political participation (unconventional): summary of hierarchical regression analysis for variables predicting how often a respondent discusses politics with friends/family (n = 25,321)

	Model 1			Model 2			Model 3		
Variable	B	SE B	B	B	SE B	B	B	SE B	β
Education	0.32	0.01	.23***	0.30	0.01	0.21***	0.30	0.01	0.21***
Household Income	0.05	0.00	.15***	0.05	0.00	0.14***	0.05	0.00	0.14***
Age	0.01	0.00	.10***	0.01	0.00	0.08***	0.01	0.00	0.07***
White				0.42	0.03	0.11***	0.31	0.03	0.08***
African American				0.28	0.04	0.06***	0.18	0.04	0.04***
Latino				-.40	0.03	-.09***	-.26	0.03	-.06***
Immigrant							-.21	0.03	-.05***
Citizenship							0.16	0.05	0.03***
R^2	0.11			0.12			0.13		

*p < .05, ** p < .01, ***p < .001

empirical studies around the Classic SES model [62] that emphasized socio-demographic and level of resources as the strongest predictors of voting. The second step of the model that includes race and ethnicity increases the R^2 to 22 %, meaning this is able to explain more of the variation and means this second step is valuable to the quantitative analysis. It is important to point out that white and African American respondents have positive and highly significant relationships with voting, while Latinos are the only group to result in a negative standardized coefficient, meaning Latino respondents represent lower levels of conventional electoral participation.

The third and final cumulative model which added immigrant and citizenship variables indicated that age and education carry the strongest weight as predictors of voting and increase the R^2 to 26 %, meaning the variables included in this study carry substantial explanatory power and strengthen the quantitative model with each step. Also interestingly, the final model demonstrates that immigrants are highly statistically significant in a negative relationship. If the respondent is an immigrant, then within this cross section of data from 2013, this means the respondent is correlated with lower voting turnout. The immigrant variable includes respondents who are naturalized citizens and can vote in elections, as well as those who have not naturalized. Latinos are the only other result that reflects a negative relationship, meaning lower voting turnout. White and African American respondents both had a highly significant and positive result.

This can suggest that the groups most targeted by securitization included in this dataset reflect lower levels of electoral voting, which can be by design if we consider the work by Schneider and Ingram [63] in which they predict that political participation depends on how individuals internalize messages about their self worth based on their exchanges with bureaucracies and government entities; if these perceive they do not matter to government, which previous research on Latinos in Arizona following the passage of S.B. 1070 has found that they indeed did [26, 54], then these groups ultimately withdraw from formal political processes, such as voting. The result is very

similar to when individuals who have been incarcerated re-enter society— their belief in government efficacy is low and they consider forms of political participation futile.

The last portion of the analysis (Table 4) examines the political effects in an unconventional method of political participation, operationalized by the measure on how often a respondent discusses politics with family and/or friends. The analysis shows the strongest predictor is continuously the respondent's education level. The variables of Latino and immigrant, however, are the only two highly significantly negative results in this piece of the analysis. This means that Latinos and immigrants result in the lowest unconventional form of participation of discussing politics with friends and/or family. White, Black, and citizen respondents (though citizenship isn't a prerequisite for discussion on politics, especially local politics that affect residents most) all result in highly significant and positive relationships, with the control variables of education and income carrying the most weight

Discussion, interpretations, and conclusion

The findings from the quantitative analyses show that Latino and immigrant respondents are consistently negative results in both the social and political aspects examined here, even when accounting for citizenship status, education level, and household income. This provides evidence of a number of important things; first, citizenship isn't the strongest predictor, which is in line with the literature reviewed in this paper indicating that the social construction of a security threat and "the other" it creates and perpetuates through fear and suspicion is *not* based on legal citizenship status, giving credence and providing evidence of the reality of racial profiling. This is especially alarming; securitization can potentially erode civil liberties and due process of American citizens based on the social perception that they *pose* a threat. Ultimately, this can potentially manifest in a number of problematic ways that prohibit the successful social and political integration of Latinos and immigrants in the U.S.

Huysmans [64] documented the securitization of immigration in Western Europe; ultimately, he concluded inclusion for immigrants became *more* difficult in a securitized context. Securitization of migration negatively impacts community solidarity, integration, and cultural identity ([64], p. 771). We add to Huysmans that the negative impact on community solidarity, integration, and cultural identity is not the result of the state's securitization process alone, but also reflects the work of private corporate interests as these are embedded in this process. Private entities are intertwined with social and political integration of immigrants in the current post 9/11 context, and this is something to watch carefully.

We consider securitization a cycle that violates civil liberties; though undemocratic, it is likely this cycle will be a perpetual one, for a number of reasons. First, we deem securitization has resulted in a diminished social and political integration of immigrants and Latinos in the U.S., which results in Latinos belonging to a social category in which a collectively organized response is all the more challenging, perpetuating a fragmented and silent response to securitization.

Secondly, this response, what is referred to by the literature as "an acquiesced response," can be expected when large corporations involved lobby millions of dollars and push a dominant and politicized narrative; this narrative keeps America in a

continual state of exception fearful of the threats to its national identity and security. This is a key detraction from African Americans' response to the War on Drugs, which is framed by a cultural understanding of civil disobedience resulting from the civil rights era. Immigrants, Latinos, and Muslims all lack the opportunity structure, the social capital, the political clout, and the financial resources to publicly oppose and placate public fears on national security. They share in common, however, being socially construed as "deviants" for political gain as well as being targeted by local police, bringing issues of trust, government efficacy, and community development to the forefront.

When profit motive is present among an industry made up of very strong, competitive, and global corporations, it is safe to assume that securitization will likely continue to grow in the U.S. without much political resistance, despite its erosion of due process and violation of individual civil rights and liberties. In holding our government's leadership accountable, it is imperative to include in our evaluation the role of private security companies as key actors in the securitization process. Research from the U.S. and Europe suggests that the social and political assimilation and integration of immigrants is highly dependent on the use of political discourse, symbols, and framing used by the state to justify policy responses. If these are punitive, those who experience them tend to lean towards alienation, instead of inclusiveness.

Profit will always guide private companies' behaviors and strategies; this is rational behavior in a marketplace. Instead of impartially regulating, the U.S. allows private industry to *shape* regulation; regulation then reflects interests relevant to private profit motive, not the interests of the public. This is a deficiency of democracy. Our goal is not to vilify private contractors but to present existing evidence that shows how private companies are inherently vested in what are critical social issues. Based on the way the system exists today, with dollars equivalent to social and political power, we can predict that marginalization and disenfranchisement of immigrants, Latinos, and Muslims (we need future research to include data on Muslims as this is incredibly difficult to acquire) will continue, leaving these groups to experience second-tier citizenship that first assumes their guilt until they prove their innocence through strict, means-tested protocols.

If the U.S. is going to continue its reliance on the private prison industrial complex in its enforcement of immigration, then it is imperative to establish ways to include oversight and public accountability. As we see more and more neoliberal economic policies became the norm not just in the U.S. but globally, we must consider regulatory frameworks as our procedural safeguards to uphold normative values of equity, fairness, and due process over that of profits. This will prove to be a challenge as private companies have the political currency and the economic means to fund their way into the policymaking arena, and will continue to lobby for the policies that will fill the most beds in their detention centers and produce the highest profits possible. As immigration enforcement moves in this direction, different avenues to offset the negative impact of private corporations need to be explored, such as regulatory frameworks, increased political participation and representation of racial and ethnic minorities and immigrants in the policy making arena, as well as ways in which we can strengthen political and social incorporation of minorities, especially Latinos and Muslims, potentially through developing and building their levels of social capital and their sense of belonging in their local communities.

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